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a witness to give an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle based alone on
its sound in motion,1 6 or the sound of a collision.' 7 However, the Mis-
souri court has held it proper to allow an expert to give an opinion as
to the speed of an automobile based upon such data.'8
No general determination can be made as to the minimum sufficiency
of data necessary to support an opinion. This question must be passed
upon first by the trial court in the light of the circumstances of each
case and is reviewable as a question of law. No case has been found
which upholds the admissibility of an opinion based upon data so scant
as that in the principal case.
Sometime in the future there may be developed a scientific technique
which can provide a method for the estimation of speed based upon data
even as meager as that used in the principal case. When this is done it
will be time enough to re-examine the rule of evidence which now
excludes such estimations.
CyRus F. LE.
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Suits Instituted in State Courts
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, hereinafter abbre-
viated as F. L. S. A., provides that employee suits for the recovery of
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation "may be maintained
in any court of competent jurisdiction."' Section 24(8) of the Judicial
Code provides that regardless of diversity of citizenship or the sum in
controversy the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
over "all suits ... arising under any law regulating commerce." 2  Sec-
tion 28 of the Judicial Code provides that "Any suit of a civil nature
... arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States... of
which the district courts of the United States are given original juris-
diction ... may be removed by the defendant... to the district courts."8
In Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand4 plaintiff employee brought
action to recover alleged overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the F. L. S. A. Action was
removed from the state court in which it was commenced. Plaintiff
moves to remand on ground that Congress intended to amend the Re-
" Law v. Gallegher, 9 Harr. (Del.) 189, 197 At. 479 (1938); Challinor v.
Axton, 246 Ky. 76, 54 S. W. (2d) 600 (1932) ; Park v. Gandio, 286 Mich. 133, 281
N. W. 565 (1935) ; Lambach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 Ad. 88 (1925).
17 Knache v. Pease Seed and Grain Co., 134 Neb. 130, 277 N. W. 798 (1938);
Mierendorf v. Soalfeld, 138 Neb. 876, 295 N. W. 901 (1941).8 Murphy v. Cole. 338 Mo. 13, 88 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1935).
152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
236 STAT. 1092 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(8).
'36 STAT. 1094 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
'65 F. Supp. 940 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
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moval Statute5 by excepting from the provisions thereof any case by
employees against their employers which arise under the F. L. S. A.
Held, motion denied. In a similar action the court in Young v. Arbyrd
Compress Co.6 granted the motion.
While it is well established that original jurisdiction of cases arising
under the F. L. S. A. is concurrent in both federal and state courts,.
the question whether an action once commenced in the state court may
be removed to a federal district court has been decided both ways as the
two principle cases illustrate. There are no decisions on the point by
either the Supreme Court or the circuit courts of appeal.8 In Volume
65 of the Federal Supplement there are four cases denying a motion to
remand and five granting such a motion.9
The confusion stems from the unfortunate wording of the Act pro-
viding that an employee's action "may be maintained0 in any court of
competent jurisdiction." While some of the early cases remanding the
suit to the state courts were decided on the ground that a suit does not
"arise under a law of the United States" within the meaning of the
Removal Statute unless the construction or effect of the law is in dis-
pute;"1 i.e., no federal question presented, the more recent decisions
denying removal refute this view. 12 These latter decisions along with
' See note 3 supra.
'66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Mo. 1946).
' Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U. S. 681 (1941); Hart v. Gregory, 218 N. C. 184, 10 S. E. (2d) 644(1940).
'An appeal from an order remanding a suit to the state court in which it was
instituted is denied by the Removal Statute, 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
g Cases cited, note 13 infra.1oItalics author's.
Unreported decisions are not listed in this note. For a partial list see Swett-
inan et at. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861 (W. D. Mo. 1941) (Reeves, J.), noted
(1941) 6 Mo. L. Rv. 519; 9 KAN. CiTy L. REv. 227; Kuligowski v. Hart, 43 F.
Supp. 207 (N. D. Ohio 1941) ; Phillips v. Pucci, 43 F. Supp. 253 (W. D. Mo. 1942)
(Reeves, J.), noted (1942) 9 U. OF CH. L. REv. 742; Booth v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D. Neb. 1942) (in part only; also relies on construction
of the word "maintained," see note 13 infra) ; Brockway v. Long, 55 F. Supp. 79(W. D. Mo. 1944) (Reeves, J.) ; Adams v. Long et al., 65 F. Supp. 310 (W. D. Mo.
1943 (Reeves, J.). This position is based upon Justice Cardozo's statement in
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 114 (1936) where he stated: "A
suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not
necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does
not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy re-
specting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination
of which the result depends." An excellent discussion criticizing the application
of this rule in cases where the action arises only because of a right granted by a
federal law will be found in (1942) 9 U. OF Cai. L. REV. 742 commenting on the
rule's application in Phillips v. Pucci, supra, and will not be dealt with here.
"Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E. D. Mo. 1946)
("Some of the cases hold that there is no real question involving interpretation of
a Federal Statute. With these we are not in accord. Unless the language of the
Fair Labor Standards Act -prevents removal, we think such cases would be remov-
able as cases arising under a law regulating interstate commerce."). Brantley v.
Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943).
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all the cases granting removal base their conclusions upon the judge's
interpretation of the word "maintained." 13
Two Supreme Court decisions 14 in another connection defined the
word: "To maintain a suit is to uphold, continue on foot and keep from
collapse a suit already begun."'15 These decisions have been heavily
relied on by district courts denying removal'0 despite the fact that in
neither case was the Supreme Court construing the word in relation to
an implied amendment of the Removal Statute. Judge Hulen in Young
" Decisions denying removal due to construction of word "maintained":
Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941) (Otis,
J.), noted (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 541, 36 ILL. L. Rav. 787, (1941) 26 MINN. L.
REv. 134; Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 253 (D. Neb. 1942);
Duval v. Protes, 51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943) (Campbell, J.); Brantley v.
Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; Sheridan v. Leitner
(S. D. N. Y. 1944) (Bondy, J.) (case reversed Sheridan v. Leitner, 44 N. Y. S. (2d)
570 (1943) and did not mention contra opinion of Judge Hulbert in McCarrigle v.
11 W. Forty Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) upon which the
New York trial judge based his decision allowing removal) ; Steiner v. Pleasant-
ville Construction, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) (Goddard, J.); Tobin
v. Hercules Powder Co., 63 F. Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945) ; Smith v. Day & Zim-
merman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Wright v. Long et at., 65 F. Supp.
279 (IV. D. Mo. 1944) (Otis, J.) ; Apple v. Shulman Publications, Inc., 65 F. Supp.
677 (D. N. J. 1943) (Smith, J.) (no mention whatsoever made of Judge Fake's
strong often quoted dicta in favor of removal in Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp.,
32 F. Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) ; Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241
(E. D. Mo. 1946); McLendon v. Beddingfield, 38 S. E. (2d) 66 (Ga. App. 1946).
Decisions granting removal:
Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) (really
dicta as case remanded due to failure of defendant to file removal petition within
time specified for filing answer by New Jersey statute); Owens v. Greenville News-
Piedmont Corp., 43 F. Supp. 785 (W. D. S. C. 1942) ; McCarrigle v. 11 W. Forty
Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) (Hulbert, J.) ; Harris v.
Reno Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943) ; Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F.
Supp. 482 (E. D. Ky. 1943), noted (1944) 7 U. OF Dxv. L. J. 96 and 42 MIcH. L. REv.
1138, aff'd but question of removal not raised, 142 F. (2d) 876 (1944) ; Sonnesyn v.
Federal Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944) (Joyce, J.), noted in (1945)
43 MicH. L. REv. 814; Koskala v. Butler Bros., 65 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1946)
(Donovan, J.) ; Johnson v. Butler Bros., 65 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1946) ; Ellems
v. Helmers, Inc. et al., 65 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y. 1944) (Abruzzo, J.) ("What-
ever discretion there might be . . . lies with the court to whom the petition for
removal is presented."); Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940
(S. D. Ill. 1946) ; Mengel v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366, 4 So. (2d) 878 (1941) ; Sheri-
dan v. Leitner, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (1943); re'd, Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F.
Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
One case fits in neither category. Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794, 796(W. D. Ky. 1943) (remanded because of the rule "that where the question of
remand is doubtful the doubt should be resolved in favor of remanding the action
to the state court"). Contra, Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482, 485 (E. D.
Ky. 1943) (the rule "not applicable where decision upon motion to remand requires
interpretation of an act of Congress").
" Smallwood et al. v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56 (1927) (construction of 1927
amendment to act providing civil government for Puerto Rico which provided
"that no suit for purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
imposed by the laws of Puerto Rico shall be maintained in the district court of
the United States for Puerto Rico." 48 U. S. C. A. §872) ; Moore Ice Cream Co.
v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373 (1933) (suit to recover taxes under statute authorizing
taxpayer to maintain a suit to recover tax, irrespective of protest. REv. AcT 1924
§1014. 43 STAT. 343). Neither involved any question pertaining to removal.
15 Smallwood et al. v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56, 61 (1927) ; Moore Ice Cream Co.
v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373. 377 (1933).
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v. Arbyrd Compress Co. states: "If we consider the definition of the
term given in Webster' 7 and the opinions of the Supreme Court, we
cannot give it such a restricted meaning as only 'to commence.' "",8
This point is partially parried by district courts allowing removal by
citing 36 Corpus Juris 33610 containing decisions "holding that main-
tained is synonymous with 'commenced.' In fact so many different and
conflicting constrictions appear to have been given the word... that its
character for exactitude of meaning is badly damaged."20
Another way of arguing that maintain means to uphold, etc., is to
state that since the state courts, in the absence of an express prohibition
by Congress, are already courts of competent jurisdiction wherein the
suit could be commenced, the use of "maintained" is meaningless unless
it be interpreted to mean "carried through to final judgment."2' How-
ever, Judge Briggle believes that Congress meant by Section 16(b) not
to fix the place where the suit might be brought but to provide who
might bring it.22 Thus he concludes "A construction denying removal
"a Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D. Neb. 1942) ; Garner
v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky. 1943); Brantley v. Augusta Ice &
Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943); Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F. Supp.
1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Steiner v. Pleasantville Construction, Inc., 59 F. Supp.
1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D.
Mo. 1946).
" Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E. D. Mo. 1946)("To continue or persevere in or with; to carry on; as to maintain an attack, a
correspondence, a legal action.").
Id. at 243.
For many other conflicting definitions of the word "maintained" see 26
WoRDs & PHRusEs, Paam. ED. 58 to 60, and 1946 Sum,'. 8 to 10. See also (1942)
14 Miss. L. J. 157.
" Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. N. J. 1940).
"This was the first point plaintiff relied on in support of his motion to re-
mand in Swettman v. Remington Rand, cited supra note 4. This view was adopted
in: Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941) ; Fred-
man v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943) ; Brantley v. Augusta Ice
& Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F. Supp.
1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209
(S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Mo.
1946). Contra: Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E. D. Ky. 1943)
("Argument ... is not impressive." Judge Ford states that since the Act provides
for recovery not only of unpaid wages hut also an additional equal amount plus
reasonable attorneys' fees and Section 256 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A.§371, vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the United States "of all suits
for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States" "it was
obviously the purpose of Congress to dissipate any doubts as to the right and
duty of state courts to entertain jurisdiction of suits arising under the Act, even
though the extra recovery authorized should be judicially determined to be in the
nature of a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of Section 256 of the Judicial
Code:'). While this allowance under the Act for extra recovery was construed
in Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) not
to be a penalty, see Mengel Co. v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366, 4 So. (2d) 878 (1941),
where the dissenting judge entertained just such a fear. See also (1941) 19 N. C.
L. REv. 251, 258.
" Swettman et a[. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S. D. fI1. 1946)
("From such examination of the legislative history and from an examination of
the Statute as finally enacted it is not reasonable to suppose that Congress had
any intention of amending the Removal Act. A reading of the entire Section 16 (b)
19471
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gives undue prominence to the word 'maintained' and accords to it a
strained meaning not intended by the lawmakers and requiring an im-
plied amendment of the Removal Act. I conclude that the Fair Labor
Standards Act neither amends the Removal Act nor excepts therefrom
cases arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act."m
A supporting point advanced in Young v Arbyrd Compress Co. is
that the "trend of recent decisions is to reduce federal jurisdiction by a
strict construction of the Removal Statute.24
A collateral point used in granting removal by way of rebuttal to the
above is that Congress has specifically amended the Removal Apt2" when
such action was the Congressional intent.
Congressional intent to aid the employees by passage of the F. L. S. A.
is invoked by district courts denying removal on the basis that employee
interest is best served if cases are completely disposed of in conveniently
located state courts.26 The court in the Swettman case, however, after
carefully considering the legislative history of the Act states: "Nothing
clearly shows that in inserting this section Congress was not intending to fix the
place where such a suit could be brought or prosecuted to a final judgment but was
concerned only with providing who might prosecute the suit and in what name the
suit would be brought.). See note (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 251 for a discussion
of the legislative history of the Act.
"Swettman et a[. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
"
4See also Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga.
1943). But see Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S. D. Ill.
1946) ("It must be conceded [that such a policy to limit jurisdiction] set forth
sound reasons why perhaps Congress should have excepted these cases from the
Removal Act. But the question . .. is solely what Congress did actually do.").5 Federal Employers Liability Act, 52 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. A. §56
provides: "The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . . . shall be con-
current with that of the courts of the several States and no case arising under this
chapter and brought in any State court ... shall be removed to any court of the
United States." Removal Statute was also amended to conform. This viewpoint
adopted in: Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940);
Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont Corp., 43 F. Supp. 785 (W. D. S. C. 1942);
Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E. D. Ky. 1943); Sonnesyn v. Federal
Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Swettman et al. v. Remington
Rand, 65 F. Supp.-940, 942 (S. D. Ill. 1946) ("In the past, in every case it has
been the policy of Congress when it intended to amend or make exceptions to the
Removal Act to do so by express words .... There is no apparent reason why
Congress should -have adopted a new and different course in the passage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act if it intended to preclude removal of cases under that
Act."). Contra: Fredman Bros., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 161, 163 (W. D. Mo. 1943)("But Congress is bound by no formula. If the meaning is clear.... ."). But see
Young & Jones v. Hiawatha Gin & Mfg. Co., 17 F. (2d) 193, 195 (S. D. Miss.
1927). For decision on the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. A. §688 see Beckwith v. Ameri-
can President Lines, Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 353 (N. D. Cal. 1946).
" Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941) (to
hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the Act to give workingmen a remedy
in a court easily accessible to them). Case criticized in (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv.
541 stating that no such contention can be found in the Congressional debates on
the Act; Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D. Neb. 1942);
Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D.. Mo. 1943); Tobin v. Hercules
Powder Co., 63 F. Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman. Inc.,
65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946).
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in the report 7 which indicates any intention to do anything other than
permit an employee's suit."2 8
Closely interwoven with this argument is the desire of the federal
judges to avoid crowding the federal docket with many small claims.2 9
However, a survey of the cases reveals that the amount in controversy
has been deemed important in only two decisions. 30 Furthermore many
cases denying removal have involved amounts over $3,000,31 while in
others the amount is not deemed of sufficient importance to even be
mentioned in the opinion.3 2  Judge Briggle states that these ideas are
reasons perhaps why Congress "should have excepted these cases" from
the Removal Statute, but the question is what Congress actually did.33
The other companion reason in this line of analogy by district courts
remanding suits under the F. L. S. A. to the state courts in which they
were started is the avoidance of expensive litigation by the employee.
57H. R. REP. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938).2 8Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand, 65 Supp. 940, 944 (S. D. Ill. 1946)
("The situation before the conference committee of the two Houses was thus:
The Senate Bill provided for suits, by employees and gave concurrent jurisdiction
to State and Federal Courts; the House Bill contained no provision for employees'
suits but conferred jurisdiction on the Federal Courts to enjoin violations of the
Act. On June 14, 1938, the conference committee presented a report which con-
tained Sections 16 and 17 of the Act as subsequently enacted.... In the conference
committee's report to the House recommending the enactment of the Act in its final
form appears the following comment regarding Section 16: '... . This section also
provides for civil reparations for violations of the wages and hours provisions. If
an employee is employed for less than the legal minimum wage, or if he is employed
in excess of the specified hours without receiving the prescribed payment for over-
time, he may recover from his employer twice the amount by which the compensa-
tion he should have received exceeds that which he actually received.' ... Nothing
appears in the report which indicates an intention to do anything other than permit
an employee's suit. The conference committee merely adopted the Senate's view
with respect to the allowance of such employee's suit and also the Senate's view
as to concurrent jurisdiction as to both State and Federal Courts by using the
words 'any court of competent jurisdiction"'). See note 22 supra.
' See note 26 supra as the cases discuss these two arguments together.
80 Harris v. Reno Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943) (judge empha-
sized fact that the district court was in the same city as the state court where
action started plus fact that the amount in controversy was $4,000 and diversity of
citizenship was present); Wright v. Long et at., 65 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Mo.
1944).
redman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943) ($19,200 and
diversity of citizenship); Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky.
1943) ($4,889 and diversity of citizenship; however, see comment on this case note
13 supra) ; Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943)
(over $3,000, but no diversity of citizenship) ; Steiner v. Pleasantville Construction,
Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) (over $3,000 and diversity of citizen-ship).
'
2 Kuligowski v. Hart, 43 F. Supp. 207 (N. D. Ohio 1941) ; Duval v. Protes,
51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F.
Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Apple v. Shulman Publications, 65 F. Supp. 677
(D. N. J. 1943).6' See comment on Swetthnan case note 24 supra. McCarrigle v. 11 Forty
Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710, 711 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ("While I realize"
that such a decision "is likely to bring to this court a considerable number of
cases, many of which could be brought and disposed of in local courts with less
inconvenience to the litigants . . .until Congress shall amend the statute . .. I
feel constrained to follow" the cases granting removal.).
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However, this point is weakened by the provision of the Act which
allows the employee to recover, in addition to double his unpaid mini-
mum wages, a reasonable attorney's fee.3 4
Other miscellaneous points considered include the recitations of the
rule that courts should not interpret a statute so as to make parts of it
surplusage unless no other construction is available.3 5 Contra decisions
counter with the rule that a partial repeal of the Removal Statute by
implication is not favored 6
One excellent argument for the state court's retention of the suit
once it is commenced in that court which has not been heavily seized
upon is the fact that in the same sentence with the much discussed "may
be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction" is a provision that
"employees may designate an agent or a representative to maintains7
such an action." As obviously Congress meant that the designated rep-
resentative might continue the suit to completion, these decisions believe
that the same interpretation should be given the word "maintain"
throughout, thereby attaching continuity.
8
Since the point is very close there are naturally excellent arguments
on both sides of the question. However, it is submitted despite the
numerical weight of the decision contra that the better reasoned decisions
are those granting removal. In view of the lack of any express evidence
of a Congressional intent that the multi-meaning word "maintained" did
in the F. L. S. A. mean to carry the suit through to completion 0 the
more reasonable view is that no amendment to the Removal Statute was
meant or implied.
Yet, due to the lack of uniformity in the decisions vithin the same
state4 0 and even within the same federal district,41 in order to preserve
"'Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
"The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fees to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action."
"Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943);
Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Young v.
Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Mo. 1946).
"Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. N. J. 1940);
Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont Corp., 43 F. Supp. 785 (W. D. S. C. 1942);
Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky. 1943); Sonnesyn v. Federal
Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Swettman et al v. Remington
Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940 (S. D. Ill. 1946). Contra: Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F.
Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943) (see comment on case in note 25 supra) ; Smith v.
Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Young v. Arbyrd
Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241, 243 (E. D. Mo. 1946) ("The removal statute has
not been repealed. It still stands. We simply hold it not applicable to cases of
the character (F. L. S. A.) before the court.").
"'Italics author's. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 28 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
"' Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943); Brantley v.
Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; Steiner v. Pleasant-
vile Construction, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
See notes 22, 25, and 28 supra.
,
0 Cases denying removal are listed first. Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp.
161 (W. D. Ky. 1943). Contra: Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E. D.
[Vol. 25
19471 NOTES AND COMMENTS 209
needed order and respect for the judicial system, Congressional action
seems imperative. It is submitted that Congress should, in addition to
scrupulously abstaining from the future use of the word "maintained"
without a clear cut definition, reword Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to dispel all of the current confusion which has attached
to the problem of whether suits brought in state courts under the
F. L. S. A. are removable to federal district courts or not. The
F. L. S. A. is certain to come under Congressional scrutiny in connec-
tion with the now famous portal to portal question 42 and such a re-
wording of Section 16(b) could be advantageously accomplished at the
same time. A workable standard may be found in the eighth sentence
of Section 28 of the Judicial Code3 which permits removal of suits
against common carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act 44 only
when they involve more than $3,000. This would provide sufficient fed-
eral decisions to which state courts could look for guidance thereby
avoiding too many jurisdictional inconsistencies.
NOEL R. S. WOODHOUSE.
Insurance--Extension of Coverage by Waiver or Estoppel
Plaintiff insurer sought a declaratory judgment to- determine its li-
ability on an automobile liability policy. The policy contained the fol-
lowing: "This policy does not apply: (a) while the automobile is used
as a public or livery conveyance. . . ." There was also a clause limiting
the agent's power with respect to waiver and estoppel. Answering two
issues submitted to it, the jury found (1) the automobile was used as
a public conveyance, and (2) the agent knew it was to be so used when
he issued the policy. Defendant abandoned a plea for reformation. The
trial court disregarded the second issue and gave judgment for plaintiff.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the submission of the
second issue was inadvertent as it rested upon parol evidence which
Ky. 1943). See comment note 13 supra on these two cases. Barron v. F. H. E.
Oil Co., 4 Wage & Hour Rep. 551 (W. D. Tex. 1941). Contra: Harris v. Reno
Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943). See also cases listed in note 41 infra.
" Cases denying removal are listed first. Apple v. Shulman Publications, 65
F. Supp. 677 (D. N. J. 1943). Contra: Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) (really a dictum, however, cited both pro and con
often). Duval v. Protes, 51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943). Contra: Ellems
v. Helmers, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y. 1944). Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F.
Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). Contra: McCarrigle v. 11 W. Forty Second
St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). In each of these cases the judges
were different and in the later of the two in each district the judge did not bother
to distinguish or overrule the previous contra decisions.
'
2 N. Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, §E, p. 3, col. 3.
4136 STAT. 1094 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
"41 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq.
